Background The use of lengthy, detailed, and complex informed consent forms is of paramount concern in biomedical research as it may not truly promote the rights and interests of research participants. The extent of information in ICFs has been the subject of debates for decades; however, no clear guidance is given. Thus, the objective of this study was to determine the perspectives of research participants about the type and extent of information they need when they are invited to participate in (...) biomedical research. Methods This multi-center, cross-sectional, descriptive survey was conducted at 54 study sites in seven Asia-Pacific countries. A modified Likert-scale questionnaire was used to determine the importance of each element in the ICF among research participants of a biomedical study, with an anchored rating scale from 1 to 5. Results Of the 2484 questionnaires distributed, 2113 were returned. The majority of respondents considered most elements required in the ICF to be ‘moderately important’ to ‘very important’ for their decision making. Major foreseeable risk, direct benefit, and common adverse effects of the intervention were considered to be of most concerned elements in the ICF. Conclusions Research participants would like to be informed of the ICF elements required by ethical guidelines and regulations; however, the importance of each element varied, e.g., risk and benefit associated with research participants were considered to be more important than the general nature or technical details of research. Using a participant-oriented approach by providing more details of the participant-interested elements while avoiding unnecessarily lengthy details of other less important elements would enhance the quality of the ICF. (shrink)

While univariate functional magnetic resonance imaging data analysis methods have been utilized successfully to map brain areas associated with cognitive and emotional functions during viewing of naturalistic stimuli such as movies, multivariate methods might provide the means to study how brain structures act in concert as networks during free viewing of movie clips. Here, to achieve this, we generalized the partial least squares analysis, based on correlations between voxels, experimental conditions, and behavioral measures, to identify large-scale neuronal networks activated during (...) the first time and repeated watching of three ∼5-min comedy clips. We identified networks that were similarly activated across subjects during free viewing of the movies, including the ones associated with self-rated experienced humorousness that were composed of the frontal, parietal, and temporal areas acting in concert. In conclusion, the PLS method seems to be well suited for the joint analysis of multi-subject neuroimaging and behavioral data to quantify a functionally relevant brain network activity without the need for explicit temporal models. (shrink)

1-pu. Ttang ŭi soksagim -- 2-pu. Mul ŭi norae -- 3-pu. Pulkkot ch'ŏrŏm -- 4-pu. Param ŭi hŭnjŏk.

우리 시 21편을 통해 현대 철학을 쉽고 재미있게 배운다! 김수영, 김춘수, 황동규, 황지우, 기형도, 최영미 등 우리에게 친숙한 현대 시인의 시를 통해 현대 철학의 주요 개념을 알기 쉽게 설명한 『철학적 시 읽기의 즐거움』. 노장사상을 전공한 동양철학자이면서 서양철학의 흐름에도 해박한 저자, 강신주는 시는 짧지만, 그 속에 철학책 한 권 못지않은 무한한 고뇌와 사유의 세계를 담고 있다고 말한다. 이 책은 우리에게 신선한 충격과 사고의 전환을 가져다준 들뢰즈, 푸코, 사르트르 같은 현대 철학자들의 사유가 우리 현대 시인들의 시와 어떻게 행복하게 만나는지 보여준다. 그리고 그 (...) 철학자들이 고뇌했던 문제들이 우리 현대 시인들이 고민했던 문제들과 다르지 않다는 점을 감각적인 문장으로 녹여낸다. (shrink)

Healing Makes Our Hearts Happy: Spirituality and Cultural Transformation among the Kalaharilu/'hoansi Richard Katz Megan Biesele and Verna St Denis Rochester Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1997. 214pp. $29.95.

Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse, von A. Schmidt.--Das Ganze und das ganz Andere; zur Kritik der reinen revolutionären Transzendenz, von W.F. Haug.--Technik und Eindimensionalität; eine Version der Technokratiethese? Von C. Offe.--Technologische Rationalität und spätkapitalistische ökonomie, von J. Bergmann.--Die geschichtliche Dimension des Realitätsprinzips, von H. Berndt und R. Reiche.--Marcuse and the New Left in America, by P. Breines.--Ausgewählte Bibliographie der Schriften Herbert Marcuses (p. 155-[161]).

Electroacupuncture (EA) and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) are often used in the management of schizophrenia. This study sought to determine whether additional EA and ECT could augment antipsychotic response and reduce related side effects. In this retrospective controlled study, 287 hospitalized schizophrenic patients who received antipsychotics (controls, n = 50) alone or combined with EA (n = 101), ECT (n = 55) or both (EA+ECT, n = 81) were identified. EA and ECT were conducted for 5 and 3 sessions per week, (...) respectively, with a maximum of 12 sessions for ECT during hospitalization. The Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) and Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) were used to assess the severity of psychotic symptoms. Clinical response on SAPS and SANS, weight gain, and adverse events were compared. Survival analysis revealed that the ECT and EA+ECT groups had markedly greater clinical response rate than controls on SAPS [72.7% and 90.1% vs. 64.0%; relative risk (RR), 1.974 and 2.628, respectively, P ≤ 0.004] and on SANS (67.3% and 70.4% vs. 42.0%; RR, 1.951 and 2.009, respectively, P ≤ 0.015). A significantly greater response rate on SANS than controls was also observed in the EA group (64.4% versus 42.0%; RR = 1.938, P = 0.008). EA-containing regimens remarkably reduced weight gain and incidences of headache, insomnia, dry mouth, and electrocardiographic abnormalities. These results suggest that EA and ECT can serve as additional treatment for enhancing antipsychotic response and reduce the side effects in hospitalized patients with schizophrenia. (shrink)

Background Adherence to ethical guidelines and regulations and protecting and respecting the dignity and autonomy of participants by obtaining a valid informed consent form (ICF) prior to participation in research are crucial; The subjects did not add signatures next to the corrections made to signatures or dates on the ICF, Multiple signatures in other fields, ICF missing/missing signature, Incorrect ICF version Signed after modification, Correction tape used to correct signature, Impersonated signature, Non-research-member signature, however, ICFs are often not properly completed, (...) which must be addressed. This study analyzed ICF signing errors and implemented measures to reduce or prevent these errors. Methods We used the plan–do–check–act (PDCA) cycle to help improve the correctness and validity of ICF signing. Results Interim and final reports from January 2016 to February 2020 including 363 ICFs were studied. The total proportion of correct ICF signatures (200, 83.3%) following the PDCA intervention was significantly higher than that before the intervention (P < 0.05). Analysis of the types of signing error demonstrated that signature errors were significantly reduced after the intervention, particularly for subjects did not add signatures next to the corrections made to signatures or dates on the ICF (16, 6.7%) and impersonated signature (0; P < 0.05). Conclusions The proportions of other error types—multiple signatures in other fields, missing or unsigned ICF, incorrect signature order, incorrect ICF version, use of correction tape to correct signature, and non-medical profession members signing the ICF—did not differ significantly. (shrink)

Rsenha da obra: GUTTMANN, Julius. 4 Filosofia do Judaismo — A História da Filosofia Judaica desde os Tempos Bíblicos até Franz Rosenzweig, São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2003, 480 p., Trad. de J. Guinsburg, Apresentação do Tradutor e Prefácio à edição Brasileira de Roberto Romano, Posfácio de Fritz Bamberger, ISBN 852730530-5.

Sociologinis tyrimas atliktas reabilitacinėje ir gydymo įstaigose, kur gydomi įvairias negalias, tarp jų ir judėjimo, turintys paaugliai. Tyrimas tranguliacinio pobūdžio. Jam atlikti buvo naudojami keli tyrimo metodai: pusiau struktūruoti interviu, stebėjimas dalyvaujant. Remtasi P. Bourdieu kapitalo teorija, lauko ir habitus sampratomis. Šis kokybinis tyrimas – tai judėjimo negalią turinčių paauglių, socializacijos patirčių gydymo ir reabilitacinėse įstaigose, socialinio vaizdinio atspindys.

The epidemic of COVID-19 appears to be reshaping the world, separating before and after, present and past. Its perceived novelty raises the question of what role the past might play in the present epidemic and in responses to it. Taking the view that the past has not passed, but is present in is material and immaterial remains, and continuously emerging from these, we argue that it should not be studied as closed narration but through the array of its traces, which (...) constitute the texture of the present. To that end, and building on long-term ethnographic research on past and present epidemics in western Kenya, we assemble here some preliminary observations on the first weeks of COVID-19 in Kenya. We explore how the acute epidemic crisis currently unfolding is intertwined with layered fragments of earlier epidemic events, attending to material infrastructures, institutional practices, and ritual responses, to the presence of virally loaded bodies, pharmaceuticals, and their residues, and to the resurgence of often painful memories and emotions. People in this region have experienced a long century of epidemics and anti-epidemic measures of varying duration and intensity, from colonial and postcolonial sleeping sickness and smallpox to HIV/AIDS and more recently cancer, alongside actual or anticipated outbreaks of cholera and Ebola. This local perception of one long epidemic qualifies the notion of a radical temporal break that the COVID-19 pandemic is often associated with in European conversations. (shrink)

1. The Tractatus doctrine of saying and showing In a letter to Russell dated 19.4.1919, written shortly after he had finished the Tractatus, Wittgenstein told Russell that the main contention of the book, to which all else, including the account of logic, is subsidiary, ‘is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by prop[osition]s -- i.e. by language -- (and, which comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by prop[osition]s, but only shown (gezeigt); (...) which I believe is the cardinal problem of philosophy’ (CL 68). This was emphasized in both preface and conclusion of the book. The preface observes that the whole sense of the book can be summed up in the following words: ‘what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence’ (TLP p.3). The conclusion of the book (TLP 7) simply repeats this. The preceding three remarks, however, are noteworthy. They make three claims. First, ‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical’ (TLP 6.522). This reiterates the leitmotif of the book, namely that there are things that cannot, by the very nature of representation, be said. But though they cannot be said, they are shown by features of the relevant system of representation. Secondly, the correct method in philosophy would really be to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. empirical propositions that have nothing to do with philosophy, and then, when someone wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions (TLP 6.53). This method, of course, is not the method that has been followed throughout the book, which consists almost exclusively of modal assertions concerning what must, can or cannot be thus and so in reality, in language and in the relation between language and reality.. (shrink)

This article explores three ways in which a cognitively entrenched mindreading (or 'theory of mind') system may bias our thinking as cognitive scientists. One issues in a form of tacit dualism, impacting scientific debates about phenomenal consciousness. Another leads us to think that our own minds are easier to know than they really are, influencing debates about self-knowledge, and about mindreading itself. And the third results in a bias in favour of empiricist over nativist accounts of cognitive development. The discussion (...) throughout is tentative and speculative, and can be regarded as an appeal for caution, as well as a call for further research. (shrink)

Nietzscheho myšlienka večného návratu toho istého nadobúda nový rozmer zvlášť po publikovaní štúdie P. S. Loeba, v ktorej sa usiluje preukázať časovú identitu večného návratu toho istého. Po viac ako storočí konsenzu v tom, že predmetná myšlienka myšlienok, ako ju charakterizoval samotný Nietzsche, je nekoherentná a logicky nesúvislá, sa vytvára priestor pre rozšírenú výmenu názorov, lebo k jej akceptovaniu – alebo zavrhnutiu – je potrebný ešte aj výskum možností jej overenie skúsenosťou. Loeb v predmetnej štúdii predkladá svoj koncept skúsenosti večného (...) návratu toho istého, s ktorým nesúhlasím. Do diskusie predkladám návrh, v ktorom rozlišujem medzi všeobecne overiteľnou skúsenosťou a skúsenosťou základnej epochálnej nálady (naladenosti), pričom touto diferenciou sa snažím poukázať, že každá epocha je generovaná prekognitívnym povedomím takej alebo onakej podoby pojmu večnosti. Následne formulujem otázku singulárnej skúsenosti okamihu, ktorá nevyplýva z otázky všeobecnej skúsenosti okamihu ako predelu času v jeho pohybe z minulosti do budúcnosti a ktorá je so všeobecnou skúsenosťou neporovnateľná. (shrink)

Enligt ett realistiskt synsätt kan ett påstående vara sant trots att det inte ens i princip är möjligt att veta att det är sant. En sanningsteoretisk antirealist kan inte godta denna möjlighet utan accepterar en eller annan version av Dummetts vetbarhetsprincip: (K) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det i princip vara möjligt att veta att det är sant. Det kan dock förefalla rimligt, även för en antirealist, att gå̊ med på̊ att det kan finnas sanningar som ingen faktiskt (...) vet (har vetat, eller kommer att veta) är sanna. Man kan därför tänka sig att en antirealist skulle acceptera principen (K) utan att därför gå med på den till synes starkare principen: (SK) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det faktiskt finnas någon som vet att det är sant. Ett mycket omdiskuterat argument – som ytterst går tillbaka till Alonzo Church, men som först publicerades i en uppsats av Frederic Fitch i Journal of Symbolic Logic 1963 – tycks emellertid visa att principen (K) implicerar principen (SK). Anta nämligen att (K) är sann, medan (SK) inte är det. Men om (SK) är falsk, så finns det ett påstående som är sant men som ingen faktiskt vet är sant. Anta nu att p är ett sådant påstående. Låt Kp betyda att någon vet att p är sant. Det galler alltså̊ att p är sant samtidigt som Kp inte är det. Betrakta nu påståendet (p ∧ −Kp). Enligt antagandet är detta påstående sant. Enligt (K) måste det då vara möjligt att någon vet att (p ∧ −Kp). D.v.s., det måste vara möjligt att påståendet K(p ∧ −Kp) är sant. Men i så fall är det också̊ möjligt att påståendet Kp ∧ K−Kp är sant, vilket i sin tur implicerar att det är möjligt att Kp ∧ −Kp är sant, vilket ju är absurt. Således kan inte (K) vara sann samtidigt som (SK) är falsk. Vi tycks således kunna sluta oss till att (K) implicerar (SK). I uppsatsen diskuterar jag några olika sätt att undgå̊ Church-Fitch paradoxala slutsats. Ett tillvägagångssätt är att ersätta kunskapsoperatorn med en hierarki av kunskapspredikat. Ett annat är baserat på distinktionen mellan faktisk och potentiell kunskap och ett förkastande av den vanliga modallogiska formaliseringen av principen (K). Den senare typen av lösning betraktas både från ett realistiskt och ett icke-realistiskt perspektiv. Utifrån denna analys kommer jag fram till slutsatsen att vi, vare sig vi är realister eller antirealister rörande sanning, kan sluta oroa oss för vetbarhetsparadoxen och ändå uppskatta Church-Fitchs argument. (shrink)

P.M.S. Hacker 1. _The problems of Intentionality_ The problems of intentionality have exercised philosophers since the dawn of their subject. In the last century they were brought afresh into the limelight by Brentano. Famously he remarked that.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Burma’s Healthcare Under Fire: My Experience as an Exiled Medical ProfessionalP. P. KyawI used to work as a medical doctor in a less developed state than many big cities in Burma1 that experienced prolonged civil wars and current similar atrocities decades before the urban areas of the country experienced them. Before everything started, I was responsible for the medical management of the most vulnerable communities and had been struggling (...) with pandemic-related medical activities. Those were the happiest years of my life. I was with one of the best international organizations, where every effort I made was directly delivered to the patients with no unnecessary paperwork. The system was efficient, my colleagues were supportive, and I had a good work-life balance. I supported my family and whoever needed temporary financial support, played music weekly, met good friends who I hung out with every weekend, and [End Page 164] found hobbies like gardening and crocheting. I was content and happy. I even postponed my plans to get registered as a doctor in the Western world.Before moving to this beautiful ethnic state in 2019, I previously worked as a government medical doctor in Yangon, the capital. As much as I loved working in those civilian hospitals, I could not support myself with a monthly pay of $100-$150 USD. It was a hard decision to leave the service because it meant I could not pursue the medical specialty that I had always longed for and had to leave like-minded supportive colleagues. In Myanmar, unless you are a civil servant, you cannot pursue further clinical specialties. However, after leaving the government’s service to work in humanitarian medical assistance in hard-to-reach areas of Burma, I learned that life is still beautiful outside my comfort zone, until February 2021 when the coup began. Democratically elected members of the country’s ruling party were overthrown by the military, which then bestowed power in a military junta.I expected the election prior to the coup in November 2020 to be an uphill battle for Burma, but nothing more. I was still in denial when I first heard the news from one of the town’s NGO staff. The person had to travel on a motorbike to inform everyone that the junta had staged the coup. No telephone or internet was working at that time. My colleagues and I cried in our office, saying, “We are so young, and the future is still ahead. I don’t think this is going to last long. Maybe it will be over in a few days or, at most, a few weeks.” Once the peaceful protests started nationwide, my friends and I provided medical cover for the protesters, initially for minor medical problems such as low sugar, low blood pressure, injuries from accidental minor slips and falls, etc. Never in my life had I imagined that I would be taking care of bullet wounds and people injured by live rounds. While learning about gunshot wounds in forensic medicine, I thought, “Oh, this is not going to be very useful because Burma is not America, and I am not going there.” Then suddenly, it became too real and more useful than I would’ve liked it to be.I always think back to one especially bloody day when many people in the town were shot with live rounds. We assisted many patients. Usually, we would go around with the protest groups until they were over in the late afternoon. The protesters were always peaceful. There were no riots, no harmful acts, or vandalism. Only when the protesters were cruelly dispersed with tear gas, high-pressure pumps, rubber bullets, and live rounds (to the head) did they decide to defend themselves while still making their voices heard. The only defenses people had to counteract the live rounds were things like metal covers, firecrackers, and slingshots.One afternoon in March 2021, my team and I took an early break for lunch—unaware that some people would lose their lives that afternoon. We followed the local protests through Facebook Live while having lunch and started to hear firecracker sounds. A few seconds later, we knew... (shrink)

This article examines the origin of experiential organization, especially whether it is salient or selective. Aron Gurwitsch believes it is salient and William James that it is selective. I argue that Gurwitsch is right, and recount his argument and his critique of James, but I also pose my own critique and critical questions on the issue. -/- Gurwitsch's argument attempts to show that the organization of consciousness is not arbitrary or merely selected in some way by the subject. He claims (...) that when consciousness is organized it is found as already organized. -/- This is important for Gurwitsch's philosophical system because if he can establish that consciousness is always originally organized, then his famous claim that the theme, thematic-field, margin structure of consciousness is an invariant patterning impervious to the subject's whim, mood, or possible noetic training, is protected at the very start. (shrink)

The differences that lie between Professor Peltz and myself seem, reading his elegant reply, to be more semantic than material. The point which he makes, in §I, that he means by ‘equivocal’ what I, following Aristotle and the tradition, would want to call ‘analogical’, disarms any criticism. For my own part I will go on writing ‘analogical’, but it would be wilful systematically to misunderstand Professor Peltz’ ‘equivocal’, now that it has been explained.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Monasticism, Buddhist and Christian: The Korean ExperienceJames A. Wiseman OSBMonasticism, Buddhist and Christian: The Korean Experience. Edited by Sunghae Kim and James W. Heisig. Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs 38. Leuven: Peeters; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008. 201 pp.In order to evaluate Monasticism, Buddhist and Christian properly, one must know something about its origin. The principal editor, Sunghae Kim, is director of the Seton Interreligious Research Center in Seoul, (...) a center that regularly sponsors interreligious dialogues at a scholarly level. In addition to those dialogues, the center also organizes a series of monthly lectures for the public at large, held each year around a specific theme. The chapters of this book were, with one exception, originally given in the 1995 lecture series and later translated from Korean into English. For that reason, most of the material will already be quite familiar to specialists in the Buddhist and Christian traditions and will at times seem to offer generalizations that would be accurate enough for presentations to the general public but would need various qualifications and nuances to meet the more rigorous standards of scholars.The first two chapters are broadly introductory. In the first, Sunghae Kim gives a brief overview of the renunciatory life in six major religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). She concludes that “in terms of strict renunciation of possessions, family, and pursuit of the ego, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Daoism stand out” (p. 35), with Buddhism and Christianity in particular being characterized by highly developed forms of monasticism per se. Bernard Senécal, a Canadian Jesuit who teaches Buddhist studies at Sogang University in Seoul, wrote the following chapter, “Korean Buddhism Today and Its Encounter with Christianity,” specifically for this book. The eight chapters that follow are the heart of the book. Jaemoon Yun, the abbot of the Korean Buddhist monastery in Chung-ju, has chapters on the history of the Buddhist monastic precepts, on nonpossession and the use of property in the saṅgha, on the organizational structure of the saṅgha, and on the homeless life and the Buddhist practice of compassion. Following each of these four chapters is one by the Benedictine monk Thomas Timpte on the corresponding topic in Christian monastic life as found in the Roman Catholic Church. A short final chapter by Younghae Yun, a professor of Buddhist studies and comparative religion at Gongguk University in Kyeong-ju, highlights a few characteristics of Buddhist and Christian life. Rather than comment on material from each chapter, I [End Page 228] will discuss in this review three points that struck me as particularly interesting and/or controversial.At the beginning of the first of his four chapters, “The History and Spirit of Christian Monastic Rules,” Thomas Timpte rightly devotes several pages to clarifying terminology. The details need not concern us here, but in general monks and nuns in the Catholic Church make public profession of the “evangelical counsels” of poverty, celibacy (sometimes called chastity), and obedience; in addition, they practice some degree of enclosure (“separation from the world”) and (except for the relatively few who are hermits) live in community. Timpte notes that although there have been men and women who practiced the evangelical counsels since New Testament times, the formal institution of Christian monastic life arose in the eastern part of the Mediterranean only around the year 300. For that reason, he argues that monasticism cannot be considered central to the Church in an institutional sense, whereas monasticism was an essential part of Buddhism from the beginning, the Buddha himself and his earliest followers all having been monks. This is one of the points about which Younghae Yun disagrees with Timpte, for the Buddhist scholar claims that even though Buddhist monks and nuns, like their Christian counterparts, take vows (precepts), and in some sense live apart from society at large, such a way of life itself “is neither essential nor central” in Buddhism (p. 185). Younghae Yun bases his argument on the fact that the Buddha considered such practices as only “a means to achieve enlightenment” and that enlightenment itself is not the true raison d’être of Buddhism but is rather a way of facilitating... (shrink)

The modal version of the ontological argument (MOA) for God’s existence is controversial, primarily, at its first premise, the premise that reads “possibly, there exists a maximally great being.” So, what’s needed is an argument for the possibility of a maximally great being, a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, has these properties essentially, and is such that it exists necessarily. Ironically, I think that such an argument can be found in the literature on the problem of evil, literature (...) generally devoted to arguments against God’s existence. In particular, I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s “free will defense” (FWD) gives us such an argument. Moreover, since most philosophers agree that the FWD is successful, I argue that most philosophers should agree that FWD gives us a successful argument for the first premise of MOA. Thus, I argue that if most philosophers agree FWD is successful, then most philosophers should agree that God exists. There are several pressing objections to this line of reasoning that I consider in the paper. I argue that these objections fail. (shrink)